Extradition in Russia: Legal Analysis and Defence

Russia’s approach to international extradition is shaped by two fundamental legal constraints. First, Article 61 of the Russian Constitution absolutely prohibits the extradition of Russian nationals to foreign states — this constitutional bar is unconditional and applies regardless of the charges, the requesting state, or the existence of any bilateral treaty. Second, Russia has no extradition treaty with the United States or the United Kingdom, and no functioning extradition relationship with most Western states following the deterioration of bilateral relations.

For Russian nationals in Russia, formal extradition to Western states is therefore doubly unavailable: no treaty exists, and even if one did, the constitutional bar would prevent extradition of nationals. For foreign nationals in Russia, extradition to Western states is theoretically possible if a bilateral treaty exists, but in practice the enforcement relationship is non-functional for most Western states. Russia does maintain active extradition relationships with CIS member states and some other bilateral partners — extradition within the post-Soviet space operates under the 1993 Minsk Convention and bilateral agreements with specific countries.

Despite the limitations on formal extradition, Russia is one of the most active users of INTERPOL’s notice system. Russia has been extensively documented as using Red Notices and Diffusions for purposes that violate INTERPOL’s Constitution — targeting business dispute opponents, political dissidents, journalists, and individuals whose prosecution is motivated by commercial or political interests rather than legitimate criminal law enforcement. Academic research, NGO reporting, and CCF decisions have all documented Russia’s pattern of INTERPOL system misuse.

The practical consequence for individuals subject to Russian-requested Interpol notices is significant travel restriction. Even though Western states will not extradite to Russia under a Red Notice, enforcement in third countries — particularly in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan), parts of the Middle East, and some African states — is a real risk. These jurisdictions have active extradition relationships with Russia and have cooperated with Russian extradition requests. A Russian Red Notice therefore creates travel restrictions that go well beyond formal extradition risk.

CCF challenges to Russian-requested Red Notices have a documented track record of success. The CCF has deleted Russian-requested notices in cases involving: prosecutions of business dispute opponents under fraud or embezzlement statutes; prosecutions of political activists or journalists under anti-extremism laws; cases where charges were fabricated in the context of corporate raiding; and cases where the underlying conduct does not constitute a crime in the majority of INTERPOL member states. The CCF applies INTERPOL’s Constitution’s Article 3 prohibition on politically motivated notices strictly in cases where the evidence of improper motivation is credible.

Evidence that supports CCF challenges to Russian notices includes: ECHR judgments against Russia in similar cases (a substantial body of case law exists); reports from credible human rights organisations documenting systematic abuse of criminal process; evidence of the commercial or political context of the prosecution; expert evidence on the functioning of the Russian judicial system; and documentary evidence of the specific circumstances of the case. The strength of the evidence package is the primary determinant of CCF success.

In Western jurisdictions, Russian extradition requests are consistently refused. UK courts have repeatedly found that Russian prosecutions in financial crime and fraud cases are politically or commercially motivated, that Russian prison conditions violate Article 3 ECHR, and that fair trial guarantees under Article 6 ECHR cannot be assured in the Russian judicial system. German, French, and other European courts have reached similar conclusions. The track record of Russian extradition requests in Western courts is, effectively, one of universal failure.

This judicial record provides both direct protection — Western courts will refuse Russian extradition requests — and evidential material for CCF challenges: documented court findings that Russian prosecutions are politically motivated or that Russian judicial processes fail human rights standards are directly relevant to CCF deletion applications. The CCF gives weight to formal court decisions from member states.

For individuals facing Russian-requested Interpol notices, the priority legal actions are: CCF challenge to the notice; careful travel risk assessment identifying which jurisdictions cooperate with Russia and should be avoided; and coordination with any civil or commercial proceedings in Russia that may be the underlying source of the criminal charges. Many Russian-requested notices arise from commercial disputes where criminal process has been weaponised — addressing the underlying commercial matter, where possible, may resolve the criminal aspect.

Contact our team for a confidential assessment of Russian-connected cases. See our guidance on CCF challenges, Red Notice removal, and non-extradition countries for travel risk context.