Countries – members of Interpol: how many states are part of Interpol and how membership is structured

The International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) represents the largest law enforcement cooperation structure in history. In the context of the globalization of crime, where financial flows and suspects cross borders within hours, the existence of a unified coordination center becomes a critical necessity for the national security of any sovereign state. However, the legal nature of this organization is often misinterpreted. Interpol is not a supranational police unit with the right to arrest but rather a complex administrative and legal platform that unites the efforts of national law enforcement agencies.

Understanding how membership is structured, what obligations it imposes, and where the boundaries of the organization’s jurisdiction lie is necessary for the correct legal assessment of risks in cross-border prosecution.

The fundamental mistake of many commentators lies in perceiving Interpol as a single body physically present in every country. The legal reality is different. Interpol members do not transfer their sovereign police powers to the headquarters in Lyon. Instead, they integrate into the network through the creation of a National Central Bureau (NCB).

NCB is the only contact point for interaction with the General Secretariat and other member countries. Usually, the NCB is a structural unit of the national police or the Ministry of Internal Affairs of a specific state. NCB staff are civil servants of their country, not employees of an international organization.

This decentralized model allows bypassing many diplomatic barriers. Police officers from different countries communicate directly through the secure communication system I-24/7, avoiding lengthy diplomatic channels usually required for international legal assistance. The system’s efficiency depends on the technical equipment and legal framework of a specific NCB (National Central Bureau). In some jurisdictions, the bureau has broad authority to conduct operational activities, while in others, it performs exclusively an administrative function of forwarding requests.

If you look at the Interpol member countries map, you can notice that there are practically no “white spots” left on it. The organization covers all continents, including specific jurisdictions in Oceania and the Caribbean. Such coverage is critically important for combating transnational crime, which often uses complex routes through small island states for money laundering or asset concealment.

The distribution of membership by region is as follows:

The existence of regional bureaus (for example, in Buenos Aires, Yaoundé, Abidjan) allows global strategies to be adapted to the local specifics of crime, whether it is drug trafficking in Latin America or cybercrime in Southeast Asia.

The status of an Interpol member is not acquired automatically by the fact of a state’s recognition by the global community. This is a complex legal process regulated by Article 4 of the Interpol Constitution. A state wishing to join must submit an official application to the Secretary General.

The process of incorporation requires the fulfillment of a number of conditions:

For the approval of the application, a qualified majority of two-thirds of the votes from the present Interpol countries is required. This creates a certain political filter. Voting at the General Assembly often becomes an arena of diplomatic struggle, where current participants can block the admission of new candidates based on their own geopolitical interests, even if formally this contradicts the principle of neutrality of the organization.

Despite global coverage, there are territories and states that remain outside the system. Analyzing these exceptions helps to better understand the legal nature of membership.

The most notable absent player is North Korea. Isolationist policies and the incompatibility of legal systems make Pyongyang’s integration into the I-24/7 network impossible at this stage.

Particular interest is drawn to the situation with Taiwan. De facto possessing all the attributes of statehood and a developed law enforcement system, Taiwan is not a member of Interpol due to the position of the People’s Republic of China. Beijing insists that Taiwan is part of China and blocks any attempts by the island to obtain independent observer or member status. This creates a significant gap in global security, as information exchange with Taiwanese police is complicated and occurs through complex intermediary schemes.

A similar situation is developing with Kosovo. Pristina’s attempts to join the organization have been repeatedly blocked by Serbia and a number of supporting countries, which justify their refusal by the lack of Kosovo’s full status as a sovereign state within the framework of the UN.

The Vatican (Holy See) is also not a member, although it maintains close contacts with the law enforcement agencies of Italy and other countries. Micronesia, Tuvalu, and Kiribati remained off the list for a long time, but the trend of recent years shows that even small Pacific states are gradually integrating into the structure.

One of the most common legal mistakes is the confusion between the concepts of membership in Interpol and the existence of extradition relations. The fact that two countries are on the list of Interpol members does not create an automatic obligation to extradite criminals.

Interpol provides a technical channel for transmitting a request for provisional arrest (via Red Notice or diffusion), but the legal basis for extradition is always:

Article 3 of the Constitution of Interpol categorically prohibits the organization from intervening in matters of a political, military, religious, or racial nature. This means that even if a member country requests a search through Interpol channels, the General Secretariat can block this request if it deems it politically motivated.

National courts of many countries do not consider a Red Notice as sufficient grounds for arrest. In Anglo-American law jurisdictions, it is often required to obtain a separate national arrest warrant, approved by a local judge. Thus, membership in Interpol speeds up the exchange of information but does not replace the complex procedures of international extradition law.

The functioning of such a large-scale structure requires significant resources. The organization’s budget is formed mainly through mandatory contributions from member countries. The size of the contribution is calculated using a complex formula that takes into account the economic weight of the state. Traditionally, the main financial burden is borne by the G7 countries, which inevitably generates discussions about the influence of these states on the organization’s policy.

In addition to direct financial contributions, Interpol countries often provide the organization with seconded officers — police officers assigned to work at the General Secretariat in Lyon or the Global Complex for Innovation in Singapore. This allows Interpol to accumulate the best global expertise but also creates risks of conflicts of interest when employees maintain loyalty to their national governments.

A wide range of participants inevitably leads to the fact that Interpol includes countries with varying standards of justice and human rights protection. Authoritarian regimes often attempt to use the organization’s channels to persecute political opponents, journalists, and business refugees, disguising political cases as criminal offenses of a general nature (fraud, embezzlement).

In response to this threat, Interpol has significantly reformed the work of the Commission for the Control of Files (CCF) in recent years. This independent body reviews complaints from individuals declared wanted and has the authority to delete data from Interpol’s databases if it violates the organization’s Constitution. Lawyers specializing in international law actively use this mechanism to protect clients from unlawful prosecution. A state’s membership in Interpol is not a guarantee of the legality of its requests, and each case is subject to thorough verification for compliance with the criteria of Article 2 and Article 3 of the Constitution.

The modern stage of organizational development is characterized not so much by geographical expansion (since there is practically nowhere left to grow) as by the deepening of technological integration. Member countries gain access to biometric hubs, facial recognition systems, and ballistic examination databases.

Particular attention is paid to cybercrime. The Global Complex for Innovation of Interpol in Singapore (IGCI) has become a hub for cyber police from around the world. Here, Interpol member countries map transforms into a digital threat map without physical borders. Participation in these programs requires national law enforcement agencies not only to have legal will but also a high level of technical competence.

Interpol today is a universal tool uniting 196 sovereign jurisdictions into a single informational ecosystem. Understanding the membership structure, the role of NCBs, and the limitations imposed by the organization’s Constitution allows for a sober assessment of the risks and opportunities of international search.

The number of participants does not guarantee automatic efficiency in each specific case but creates an indispensable platform for dialogue. For a subject who has come under the attention of this system, it is critically important to distinguish between the technical capabilities of search and the legal grounds for extradition, which always remain the prerogative of national law and interstate agreements.

If you are faced with the illegal use of Interpol channels against you or your business, or if you require a risk assessment of extradition in one of the member countries, the situation requires a detailed legal analysis of the case materials.

Contact our team for a confidential review of your situation and the development of a defense strategy.